Daily Papers

Dialogue contradiction is a critical issue in open-domain dialogue systems. The contextualization nature of conversations makes dialogue contradiction detection rather challenging. In this work, we propose a benchmark for Contradiction Detection in Chinese Conversations, namely CDConv. It contains 12K multi-turn conversations annotated with three typical contradiction categories: Intra-sentence Contradiction, Role Confusion, and History Contradiction. To efficiently construct the CDConv conversations, we devise a series of methods for automatic conversation generation, which simulate common user behaviors that trigger chatbots to make contradictions. We conduct careful manual quality screening of the constructed conversations and show that state-of-the-art Chinese chatbots can be easily goaded into making contradictions. Experiments on CDConv show that properly modeling contextual information is critical for dialogue contradiction detection, but there are still unresolved challenges that require future research.

Though chatbots based on large neural models can often produce fluent responses in open domain conversations, one salient error type is contradiction or inconsistency with the preceding conversation turns. Previous work has treated contradiction detection in bot responses as a task similar to natural language inference, e.g., detect the contradiction between a pair of bot utterances. However, utterances in conversations may contain co-references or ellipsis, and using these utterances as is may not always be sufficient for identifying contradictions. This work aims to improve the contradiction detection via rewriting all bot utterances to restore antecedents and ellipsis. We curated a new dataset for utterance rewriting and built a rewriting model on it. We empirically demonstrate that this model can produce satisfactory rewrites to make bot utterances more complete. Furthermore, using rewritten utterances improves contradiction detection performance significantly, e.g., the AUPR and joint accuracy scores (detecting contradiction along with evidence) increase by 6.5% and 4.5% (absolute increase), respectively.

Large language models (large LMs) are susceptible to producing text with hallucinated content. Self-contradiction, where the LM generates two contradictory sentences within the same context, is an important form of hallucination. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis on self-contradiction for state-of-the-art, instruction-tuned LMs, including evaluation, detection, and mitigation. To effectively trigger self-contradictions, we design a framework that constrains LMs to generate appropriate sentence pairs. Our evaluation on these sentence pairs reveals that self-contradictions occur frequently across different LMs for both famous and lesser-known topics. Next, we prompt the LMs to detect self-contradictions. Our results indicate that ChatGPT and GPT-4 are able to accurately identify self-contradictions, while Vicuna-13B struggles to do so. For example, with our best prompting method, ChatGPT achieves 91.0% precision and 80.5% recall on the sentence pairs generated by itself. To automatically mitigate self-contradictions, we develop an iterative algorithm that prompts the LMs to remove the detected self-contradictions from the generated text. Our algorithm successfully revises the text such that self-contradictions are significantly reduced, while maintaining its fluency and informativeness. Importantly, our entire pipeline of triggering, detecting, and mitigating self-contradictions is applicable to black-box LMs and does not require any external grounded knowledge.

Natural Language Inference (NLI) is a hot topic research in natural language processing, contradiction detection between sentences is a special case of NLI. This is considered a difficult NLP task which has a big influence when added as a component in many NLP applications, such as Question Answering Systems, text Summarization. Arabic Language is one of the most challenging low-resources languages in detecting contradictions due to its rich lexical, semantics ambiguity. We have created a data set of more than 12k sentences and named ArNLI, that will be publicly available. Moreover, we have applied a new model inspired by Stanford contradiction detection proposed solutions on English language. We proposed an approach to detect contradictions between pairs of sentences in Arabic language using contradiction vector combined with language model vector as an input to machine learning model. We analyzed results of different traditional machine learning classifiers and compared their results on our created data set (ArNLI) and on an automatic translation of both PHEME, SICK English data sets. Best results achieved using Random Forest classifier with an accuracy of 99%, 60%, 75% on PHEME, SICK and ArNLI respectively.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Understanding entailment and contradiction is fundamental to understanding natural language, and inference about entailment and contradiction is a valuable testing ground for the development of semantic representations. However, machine learning research in this area has been dramatically limited by the lack of large-scale resources. To address this, we introduce the Stanford Natural Language Inference corpus, a new, freely available collection of labeled sentence pairs, written by humans doing a novel grounded task based on image captioning. At 570K pairs, it is two orders of magnitude larger than all other resources of its type. This increase in scale allows lexicalized classifiers to outperform some sophisticated existing entailment models, and it allows a neural network-based model to perform competitively on natural language inference benchmarks for the first time.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

To quantify how well natural language understanding models can capture consistency in a general conversation, we introduce the DialoguE COntradiction DEtection task (DECODE) and a new conversational dataset containing both human-human and human-bot contradictory dialogues. We then compare a structured utterance-based approach of using pre-trained Transformer models for contradiction detection with the typical unstructured approach. Results reveal that: (i) our newly collected dataset is notably more effective at providing supervision for the dialogue contradiction detection task than existing NLI data including those aimed to cover the dialogue domain; (ii) the structured utterance-based approach is more robust and transferable on both analysis and out-of-distribution dialogues than its unstructured counterpart. We also show that our best contradiction detection model correlates well with human judgments and further provide evidence for its usage in both automatically evaluating and improving the consistency of state-of-the-art generative chatbots.

Knowledge-intensive language understanding tasks require Language Models (LMs) to integrate relevant context, mitigating their inherent weaknesses, such as incomplete or outdated knowledge. Nevertheless, studies indicate that LMs often ignore the provided context as it can conflict with the pre-existing LM's memory learned during pre-training. Moreover, conflicting knowledge can already be present in the LM's parameters, termed intra-memory conflict. Existing works have studied the two types of knowledge conflicts only in isolation. We conjecture that the (degree of) intra-memory conflicts can in turn affect LM's handling of context-memory conflicts. To study this, we introduce the DYNAMICQA dataset, which includes facts with a temporal dynamic nature where a fact can change with a varying time frequency and disputable dynamic facts, which can change depending on the viewpoint. DYNAMICQA is the first to include real-world knowledge conflicts and provide context to study the link between the different types of knowledge conflicts. With the proposed dataset, we assess the use of uncertainty for measuring the intra-memory conflict and introduce a novel Coherent Persuasion (CP) score to evaluate the context's ability to sway LM's semantic output. Our extensive experiments reveal that static facts, which are unlikely to change, are more easily updated with additional context, relative to temporal and disputable facts.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have emerged as a powerful method for enhancing large language models (LLMs) with up-to-date information. However, the retrieval step in RAG can sometimes surface documents containing contradictory information, particularly in rapidly evolving domains such as news. These contradictions can significantly impact the performance of LLMs, leading to inconsistent or erroneous outputs. This study addresses this critical challenge in two ways. First, we present a novel data generation framework to simulate different types of contradictions that may occur in the retrieval stage of a RAG system. Second, we evaluate the robustness of different LLMs in performing as context validators, assessing their ability to detect contradictory information within retrieved document sets. Our experimental results reveal that context validation remains a challenging task even for state-of-the-art LLMs, with performance varying significantly across different types of contradictions. While larger models generally perform better at contradiction detection, the effectiveness of different prompting strategies varies across tasks and model architectures. We find that chain-of-thought prompting shows notable improvements for some models but may hinder performance in others, highlighting the complexity of the task and the need for more robust approaches to context validation in RAG systems.

While accurately detecting and correcting factual contradictions in language model outputs has become increasingly important as their capabilities improve, doing so is highly challenging. We propose a novel method, FACTTRACK, for tracking atomic facts and addressing factual contradictions. Crucially, FACTTRACK also maintains time-aware validity intervals for each fact, allowing for change over time. At a high level, FACTTRACK consists of a four-step pipeline to update a world state data structure for each new event: (1) decompose the event into directional atomic facts; (2) determine the validity interval of each atomic fact using the world state; (3) detect contradictions with existing facts in the world state; and finally (4) add new facts to the world state and update existing atomic facts. When we apply FACTTRACK to contradiction detection on structured story outlines, we find that FACTTRACK using LLaMA2-7B-Chat substantially outperforms a fair baseline using LLaMA2-7B-Chat, and achieves performance comparable to a GPT4 baseline. Moreover, when using GPT4, FACTTRACK significantly outperforms the GPT4 baseline.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

Text-to-image diffusion models excel at generating high-quality, diverse images from natural language prompts. However, they often fail to produce semantically accurate results when the prompt contains concept combinations that contradict their learned priors. We define this failure mode as contextual contradiction, where one concept implicitly negates another due to entangled associations learned during training. To address this, we propose a stage-aware prompt decomposition framework that guides the denoising process using a sequence of proxy prompts. Each proxy prompt is constructed to match the semantic content expected to emerge at a specific stage of denoising, while ensuring contextual coherence. To construct these proxy prompts, we leverage a large language model (LLM) to analyze the target prompt, identify contradictions, and generate alternative expressions that preserve the original intent while resolving contextual conflicts. By aligning prompt information with the denoising progression, our method enables fine-grained semantic control and accurate image generation in the presence of contextual contradictions. Experiments across a variety of challenging prompts show substantial improvements in alignment to the textual prompt.

Large language models (LLMs) appear to bias their survey answers toward certain values. Nonetheless, some argue that LLMs are too inconsistent to simulate particular values. Are they? To answer, we first define value consistency as the similarity of answers across (1) paraphrases of one question, (2) related questions under one topic, (3) multiple-choice and open-ended use-cases of one question, and (4) multilingual translations of a question to English, Chinese, German, and Japanese. We apply these measures to a few large (>=34b), open LLMs including llama-3, as well as gpt-4o, using eight thousand questions spanning more than 300 topics. Unlike prior work, we find that models are relatively consistent across paraphrases, use-cases, translations, and within a topic. Still, some inconsistencies remain. Models are more consistent on uncontroversial topics (e.g., in the U.S., "Thanksgiving") than on controversial ones ("euthanasia"). Base models are both more consistent compared to fine-tuned models and are uniform in their consistency across topics, while fine-tuned models are more inconsistent about some topics ("euthanasia") than others ("women's rights") like our human subjects (n=165).

In recent times, large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on various document-level tasks such as document classification, summarization, and question-answering. However, research on understanding their capabilities on the task of self-contradictions in long documents has been very limited. In this work, we introduce ContraDoc, the first human-annotated dataset to study self-contradictions in long documents across multiple domains, varying document lengths, self-contradictions types, and scope. We then analyze the current capabilities of four state-of-the-art open-source and commercially available LLMs: GPT3.5, GPT4, PaLM2, and LLaMAv2 on this dataset. While GPT4 performs the best and can outperform humans on this task, we find that it is still unreliable and struggles with self-contradictions that require more nuance and context. We release the dataset and all the code associated with the experiments (https://github.com/ddhruvkr/CONTRADOC).

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.

The full power of human language-based communication cannot be realized without negation. All human languages have some form of negation. Despite this, negation remains a challenging phenomenon for current natural language understanding systems. To facilitate the future development of models that can process negation effectively, we present CONDAQA, the first English reading comprehension dataset which requires reasoning about the implications of negated statements in paragraphs. We collect paragraphs with diverse negation cues, then have crowdworkers ask questions about the implications of the negated statement in the passage. We also have workers make three kinds of edits to the passage -- paraphrasing the negated statement, changing the scope of the negation, and reversing the negation -- resulting in clusters of question-answer pairs that are difficult for models to answer with spurious shortcuts. CONDAQA features 14,182 question-answer pairs with over 200 unique negation cues and is challenging for current state-of-the-art models. The best performing model on CONDAQA (UnifiedQA-v2-3b) achieves only 42% on our consistency metric, well below human performance which is 81%. We release our dataset, along with fully-finetuned, few-shot, and zero-shot evaluations, to facilitate the development of future NLP methods that work on negated language.

We explore the task of improving persona consistency of dialogue agents. Recent models tackling consistency often train with additional Natural Language Inference (NLI) labels or attach trained extra modules to the generative agent for maintaining consistency. However, such additional labels and training can be demanding. Also, we find even the best-performing persona-based agents are insensitive to contradictory words. Inspired by social cognition and pragmatics, we endow existing dialogue agents with public self-consciousness on the fly through an imaginary listener. Our approach, based on the Rational Speech Acts framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012), can enforce dialogue agents to refrain from uttering contradiction. We further extend the framework by learning the distractor selection, which has been usually done manually or randomly. Results on Dialogue NLI (Welleck et al., 2019) and PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018) dataset show that our approach reduces contradiction and improves consistency of existing dialogue models. Moreover, we show that it can be generalized to improve context-consistency beyond persona in dialogues.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

We propose the task of narrative incoherence detection as a new arena for inter-sentential semantic understanding: Given a multi-sentence narrative, decide whether there exist any semantic discrepancies in the narrative flow. Specifically, we focus on the missing sentence and discordant sentence detection. Despite its simple setup, this task is challenging as the model needs to understand and analyze a multi-sentence narrative, and predict incoherence at the sentence level. As an initial step towards this task, we implement several baselines either directly analyzing the raw text (token-level) or analyzing learned sentence representations (sentence-level). We observe that while token-level modeling has better performance when the input contains fewer sentences, sentence-level modeling performs better on longer narratives and possesses an advantage in efficiency and flexibility. Pre-training on large-scale data and auxiliary sentence prediction training objective further boost the detection performance of the sentence-level model.

Incongruence detection in eyewitness narratives is critical for understanding the reliability of testimonies, yet traditional approaches often fail to address the nuanced inconsistencies inherent in such accounts. In this paper, we introduce a novel task of incongruence detection in eyewitness testimonies. Given a pair of testimonies containing of multiple pairs of question and answer by two subjects, we identify contextually related incongruence between the two subjects. We also mark the span of incongruences in the utterances. To achieve this, we developed MIND(MultI-EyewitNess Deception) - a comprehensive dataset consisting of 2927 pairs of contextually related answers designed to capture both explicit and implicit contradictions. INstruction - TunEd iNcongruity Detection framework based on 6W and multi-hop reasoning approach, aka. INTEND. Drawing from investigative techniques, INTEND address the task as a close-style problem, contradicting on the who, what, when, where and why aspect of the content. Our findings shows that prompt tuning, especially when utilizing our framework, enhances the detection of incongruences by a margin of +5.63 percent. We compare our approach with multiple fine-tuning and prompt tuning techniques on MLMs and LLMs. Emperical results demonstrate convincing performance improvement in F1-score over fine-tuned and regular prompt-tuning techniques, highlighting the effectiveness of our approach.

Factual inconsistencies pose a significant hurdle for the faithful summarization by generative models. While a major direction to enhance inconsistency detection is to derive stronger Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, we propose an orthogonal aspect that underscores the importance of incorporating task-specific taxonomy into the inference. To this end, we consolidate key error types of inconsistent facts in summaries, and incorporate them to facilitate both the zero-shot and supervised paradigms of LLMs. Extensive experiments on ten datasets of five distinct domains suggest that, zero-shot LLM inference could benefit from the explicit solution space depicted by the error type taxonomy, and achieves state-of-the-art performance overall, surpassing specialized non-LLM baselines, as well as recent LLM baselines. We further distill models that fuse the taxonomy into parameters through our designed prompt completions and supervised training strategies, efficiently substituting state-of-the-art zero-shot inference with much larger LLMs.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are extensively used today across various sectors, including academia, research, business, and finance, for tasks such as text generation, summarization, and translation. Despite their widespread adoption, these models often produce incorrect and misleading information, exhibiting a tendency to hallucinate. This behavior can be attributed to several factors, with consistency and reasoning capabilities being significant contributors. LLMs frequently lack the ability to generate explanations and engage in coherent reasoning, leading to inaccurate responses. Moreover, they exhibit inconsistencies in their outputs. This paper aims to evaluate and compare the consistency and reasoning capabilities of both public and proprietary LLMs. The experiments utilize the Boolq dataset as the ground truth, comprising questions, answers, and corresponding explanations. Queries from the dataset are presented as prompts to the LLMs, and the generated responses are evaluated against the ground truth answers. Additionally, explanations are generated to assess the models' reasoning abilities. Consistency is evaluated by repeatedly presenting the same query to the models and observing for variations in their responses. For measuring reasoning capabilities, the generated explanations are compared to the ground truth explanations using metrics such as BERT, BLEU, and F-1 scores. The findings reveal that proprietary models generally outperform public models in terms of both consistency and reasoning capabilities. However, even when presented with basic general knowledge questions, none of the models achieved a score of 90\% in both consistency and reasoning. This study underscores the direct correlation between consistency and reasoning abilities in LLMs and highlights the inherent reasoning challenges present in current language models.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Factual consistency is one of the most important requirements when editing high quality documents. It is extremely important for automatic text generation systems like summarization, question answering, dialog modeling, and language modeling. Still, automated factual inconsistency detection is rather under-studied. Existing work has focused on (a) finding fake news keeping a knowledge base in context, or (b) detecting broad contradiction (as part of natural language inference literature). However, there has been no work on detecting and explaining types of factual inconsistencies in text, without any knowledge base in context. In this paper, we leverage existing work in linguistics to formally define five types of factual inconsistencies. Based on this categorization, we contribute a novel dataset, FICLE (Factual Inconsistency CLassification with Explanation), with ~8K samples where each sample consists of two sentences (claim and context) annotated with type and span of inconsistency. When the inconsistency relates to an entity type, it is labeled as well at two levels (coarse and fine-grained). Further, we leverage this dataset to train a pipeline of four neural models to predict inconsistency type with explanations, given a (claim, context) sentence pair. Explanations include inconsistent claim fact triple, inconsistent context span, inconsistent claim component, coarse and fine-grained inconsistent entity types. The proposed system first predicts inconsistent spans from claim and context; and then uses them to predict inconsistency types and inconsistent entity types (when inconsistency is due to entities). We experiment with multiple Transformer-based natural language classification as well as generative models, and find that DeBERTa performs the best. Our proposed methods provide a weighted F1 of ~87% for inconsistency type classification across the five classes.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Existing techniques for training language models can be misaligned with the truth: if we train models with imitation learning, they may reproduce errors that humans make; if we train them to generate text that humans rate highly, they may output errors that human evaluators can't detect. We propose circumventing this issue by directly finding latent knowledge inside the internal activations of a language model in a purely unsupervised way. Specifically, we introduce a method for accurately answering yes-no questions given only unlabeled model activations. It works by finding a direction in activation space that satisfies logical consistency properties, such as that a statement and its negation have opposite truth values. We show that despite using no supervision and no model outputs, our method can recover diverse knowledge represented in large language models: across 6 models and 10 question-answering datasets, it outperforms zero-shot accuracy by 4\% on average. We also find that it cuts prompt sensitivity in half and continues to maintain high accuracy even when models are prompted to generate incorrect answers. Our results provide an initial step toward discovering what language models know, distinct from what they say, even when we don't have access to explicit ground truth labels.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Generative AI models exhibit remarkable potential; however, hallucinations across various tasks present a significant challenge, particularly for longer inputs that current approaches struggle to address effectively. We introduce SCALE (Source Chunking Approach for Large-scale inconsistency Evaluation), a task-agnostic model for detecting factual inconsistencies using a novel chunking strategy. Specifically, SCALE is a Natural Language Inference (NLI) based model that uses large text chunks to condition over long texts. This approach achieves state-of-the-art performance in factual inconsistency detection for diverse tasks and long inputs. Additionally, we leverage the chunking mechanism and employ a novel algorithm to explain SCALE's decisions through relevant source sentence retrieval. Our evaluations reveal that SCALE outperforms existing methods on both standard benchmarks and a new long-form dialogue dataset ScreenEval we constructed. Moreover, SCALE surpasses competitive systems in efficiency and model explanation evaluations. We have released our code and data publicly to GitHub.

Professionals in academia, law, and finance audit their documents because inconsistencies can result in monetary, reputational, and scientific costs. Language models (LMs) have the potential to dramatically speed up this auditing process. To understand their abilities, we introduce a benchmark, FIND (Finding INconsistencies in Documents), where each example is a document with an inconsistency inserted manually by a domain expert. Despite the documents being long, technical, and complex, the best-performing model (gpt-5) recovered 64% of the inserted inconsistencies. Surprisingly, gpt-5 also found undiscovered inconsistencies present in the original documents. For example, on 50 arXiv papers, we judged 136 out of 196 of the model's suggestions to be legitimate inconsistencies missed by the original authors. However, despite these findings, even the best models miss almost half of the inconsistencies in FIND, demonstrating that inconsistency detection is still a challenging task.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Ambiguity is an intrinsic feature of natural language. Managing ambiguity is a key part of human language understanding, allowing us to anticipate misunderstanding as communicators and revise our interpretations as listeners. As language models (LMs) are increasingly employed as dialogue interfaces and writing aids, handling ambiguous language is critical to their success. We characterize ambiguity in a sentence by its effect on entailment relations with another sentence, and collect AmbiEnt, a linguist-annotated benchmark of 1,645 examples with diverse kinds of ambiguity. We design a suite of tests based on AmbiEnt, presenting the first evaluation of pretrained LMs to recognize ambiguity and disentangle possible meanings. We find that the task remains extremely challenging, including for the recent GPT-4, whose generated disambiguations are considered correct only 32% of the time in human evaluation, compared to 90% for disambiguations in our dataset. Finally, to illustrate the value of ambiguity-sensitive tools, we show that a multilabel NLI model can flag political claims in the wild that are misleading due to ambiguity. We encourage the field to rediscover the importance of ambiguity for NLP.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

Despite alarm over the reliance of machine learning systems on so-called spurious patterns, the term lacks coherent meaning in standard statistical frameworks. However, the language of causality offers clarity: spurious associations are due to confounding (e.g., a common cause), but not direct or indirect causal effects. In this paper, we focus on natural language processing, introducing methods and resources for training models less sensitive to spurious patterns. Given documents and their initial labels, we task humans with revising each document so that it (i) accords with a counterfactual target label; (ii) retains internal coherence; and (iii) avoids unnecessary changes. Interestingly, on sentiment analysis and natural language inference tasks, classifiers trained on original data fail on their counterfactually-revised counterparts and vice versa. Classifiers trained on combined datasets perform remarkably well, just shy of those specialized to either domain. While classifiers trained on either original or manipulated data alone are sensitive to spurious features (e.g., mentions of genre), models trained on the combined data are less sensitive to this signal. Both datasets are publicly available.

We train a 318M-parameter Transformer language model from scratch on a curated corpus of 1.56 billion tokens of pure Classical Chinese, with zero English characters or Arabic numerals. Through systematic out-of-distribution (OOD) testing, we investigate whether the model can distinguish known from unknown inputs, and crucially, whether it can express this distinction in its generated text. We find a clear dissociation between internal and external uncertainty. Internally, the model exhibits a perplexity jump ratio of 2.39x between real and fabricated historical events (p = 8.9e-11, n = 92 per group), with semi-fabricated events (real figures + fictional events) showing the highest perplexity (4.24x, p = 1.1e-16), demonstrating genuine factual encoding beyond syntactic pattern matching. Externally, however, the model never learns to express uncertainty: classical Chinese epistemic markers appear at lower rates for OOD questions (3.5%) than for in-distribution questions (8.3%, p = 0.023), reflecting rhetorical conventions rather than genuine metacognition. We replicate both findings across three languages (Classical Chinese, English, Japanese), three writing systems, and eight models from 110M to 1.56B parameters. We further show that uncertainty expression frequency is determined entirely by training data conventions, with Classical Chinese models showing a "humility paradox" (more hedging for known topics), while Japanese models almost never hedge. We argue that metacognitive expression -- the ability to say "I don't know" -- does not emerge from language modeling alone and requires explicit training signals such as RLHF.

Ranking passages by prompting a large language model (LLM) can achieve promising performance in modern information retrieval (IR) systems. A common approach is to sort the ranking list by prompting LLMs for pairwise comparison. However, sorting-based methods require consistent comparisons to correctly sort the passages, which we show that LLMs often violate. We identify two kinds of intrinsic inconsistency in LLM-based pairwise comparisons: order inconsistency which leads to conflicting results when switching the passage order, and transitive inconsistency which leads to non-transitive triads among all preference pairs. In this paper, we propose LLM-RankFusion, an LLM-based ranking framework that mitigates these inconsistencies and produces a robust ranking list. LLM-RankFusion mitigates order inconsistency using in-context learning (ICL) to demonstrate order-agnostic comparisons and calibration to estimate the underlying preference probability between two passages. We then address transitive inconsistency by aggregating the ranking results from multiple rankers. In our experiments, we empirically show that LLM-RankFusion can significantly reduce inconsistent pairwise comparison results, and improve the ranking quality by making the final ranking list more robust.

At present, different deep learning models are presenting high accuracy on popular inference datasets such as SNLI, MNLI, and SciTail. However, there are different indicators that those datasets can be exploited by using some simple linguistic patterns. This fact poses difficulties to our understanding of the actual capacity of machine learning models to solve the complex task of textual inference. We propose a new set of syntactic tasks focused on contradiction detection that require specific capacities over linguistic logical forms such as: Boolean coordination, quantifiers, definite description, and counting operators. We evaluate two kinds of deep learning models that implicitly exploit language structure: recurrent models and the Transformer network BERT. We show that although BERT is clearly more efficient to generalize over most logical forms, there is space for improvement when dealing with counting operators. Since the syntactic tasks can be implemented in different languages, we show a successful case of cross-lingual transfer learning between English and Portuguese.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Studying the responses of large language models (LLMs) to loopholes presents a two-fold opportunity. First, it affords us a lens through which to examine ambiguity and pragmatics in LLMs, since exploiting a loophole requires identifying ambiguity and performing sophisticated pragmatic reasoning. Second, loopholes pose an interesting and novel alignment problem where the model is presented with conflicting goals and can exploit ambiguities to its own advantage. To address these questions, we design scenarios where LLMs are given a goal and an ambiguous user instruction in conflict with the goal, with scenarios covering scalar implicature, structural ambiguities, and power dynamics. We then measure different models' abilities to exploit loopholes to satisfy their given goals as opposed to the goals of the user. We find that both closed-source and stronger open-source models can identify ambiguities and exploit their resulting loopholes, presenting a potential AI safety risk. Our analysis indicates that models which exploit loopholes explicitly identify and reason about both ambiguity and conflicting goals.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

Why do language models sometimes prefer correct statements even when trained on mixed-quality data? We introduce the Compression--Consistency Principle: next-token prediction favors hypotheses that allow shorter and more internally consistent descriptions of the training data. Truth bias emerges only when false alternatives are structurally harder to compress. We test this using small GPT-2-style character-level transformers (3.5M--86M parameters) on synthetic math corpora with controlled mixtures of correct and incorrect rules. In the random-error setting, models strongly prefer correct completions in paired evaluation: 83.1% accuracy at balanced data and 67.0% even when correct rules appear in only 10% of the corpus. Replacing random errors with a coherent but mathematically incorrect rule system largely eliminates the preference (near-chance accuracy). In a more natural-language-like synthetic world, the effect is weaker but still present (57.7%). Additional experiments show that embedding verification steps can restore preference for correctness even at small scale, while increasing the number of consistent rules produces a graded improvement in accuracy. Our results suggest that what appears as a "truth bias" is largely a side effect of compression pressure and preference for internal consistency, rather than an intrinsic drive toward truth. Full code and data are available at https://github.com/Rai220/compression-drives-truth.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

In the summarization domain, a key requirement for summaries is to be factually consistent with the input document. Previous work has found that natural language inference (NLI) models do not perform competitively when applied to inconsistency detection. In this work, we revisit the use of NLI for inconsistency detection, finding that past work suffered from a mismatch in input granularity between NLI datasets (sentence-level), and inconsistency detection (document level). We provide a highly effective and light-weight method called SummaCConv that enables NLI models to be successfully used for this task by segmenting documents into sentence units and aggregating scores between pairs of sentences. On our newly introduced benchmark called SummaC (Summary Consistency) consisting of six large inconsistency detection datasets, SummaCConv obtains state-of-the-art results with a balanced accuracy of 74.4%, a 5% point improvement compared to prior work. We make the models and datasets available: https://github.com/tingofurro/summac

Misunderstandings arise not only in interpersonal communication but also between humans and Large Language Models (LLMs). Such discrepancies can make LLMs interpret seemingly unambiguous questions in unexpected ways, yielding incorrect responses. While it is widely acknowledged that the quality of a prompt, such as a question, significantly impacts the quality of the response provided by LLMs, a systematic method for crafting questions that LLMs can better comprehend is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we present a method named `Rephrase and Respond' (RaR), which allows LLMs to rephrase and expand questions posed by humans and provide responses in a single prompt. This approach serves as a simple yet effective prompting method for improving performance. We also introduce a two-step variant of RaR, where a rephrasing LLM first rephrases the question and then passes the original and rephrased questions together to a different responding LLM. This facilitates the effective utilization of rephrased questions generated by one LLM with another. Our experiments demonstrate that our methods significantly improve the performance of different models across a wide range to tasks. We further provide a comprehensive comparison between RaR and the popular Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods, both theoretically and empirically. We show that RaR is complementary to CoT and can be combined with CoT to achieve even better performance. Our work not only contributes to enhancing LLM performance efficiently and effectively but also sheds light on a fair evaluation of LLM capabilities. Data and codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/Rephrase-and-Respond.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

What happens when a storyteller forgets its own story? Large Language Models (LLMs) can now generate narratives spanning tens of thousands of words, but they often fail to maintain consistency throughout. When generating long-form narratives, these models can contradict their own established facts, character traits, and world rules. Existing story generation benchmarks focus mainly on plot quality and fluency, leaving consistency errors largely unexplored. To address this gap, we present ConStory-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate narrative consistency in long-form story generation. It contains 2,000 prompts across four task scenarios and defines a taxonomy of five error categories with 19 fine-grained subtypes. We also develop ConStory-Checker, an automated pipeline that detects contradictions and grounds each judgment in explicit textual evidence. Evaluating a range of LLMs through five research questions, we find that consistency errors show clear tendencies: they are most common in factual and temporal dimensions, tend to appear around the middle of narratives, occur in text segments with higher token-level entropy, and certain error types tend to co-occur. These findings can inform future efforts to improve consistency in long-form narrative generation. Our project page is available at https://picrew.github.io/constory-bench.github.io/.

Recently, contrastive learning has been shown to be effective in improving pre-trained language models (PLM) to derive high-quality sentence representations. It aims to pull close positive examples to enhance the alignment while push apart irrelevant negatives for the uniformity of the whole representation space. However, previous works mostly adopt in-batch negatives or sample from training data at random. Such a way may cause the sampling bias that improper negatives (e.g. false negatives and anisotropy representations) are used to learn sentence representations, which will hurt the uniformity of the representation space. To address it, we present a new framework DCLR (Debiased Contrastive Learning of unsupervised sentence Representations) to alleviate the influence of these improper negatives. In DCLR, we design an instance weighting method to punish false negatives and generate noise-based negatives to guarantee the uniformity of the representation space. Experiments on seven semantic textual similarity tasks show that our approach is more effective than competitive baselines. Our code and data are publicly available at the link: blue{https://github.com/RUCAIBox/DCLR}.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

With the growing importance of detecting misinformation, many studies have focused on verifying factual claims by retrieving evidence. However, canonical fact verification tasks do not apply to catching subtle differences in factually consistent claims, which might still bias the readers, especially on contentious political or economic issues. Our underlying assumption is that among the trusted sources, one's argument is not necessarily more true than the other, requiring comparison rather than verification. In this study, we propose ClaimDiff, a novel dataset that primarily focuses on comparing the nuance between claim pairs. In ClaimDiff, we provide 2,941 annotated claim pairs from 268 news articles. We observe that while humans are capable of detecting the nuances between claims, strong baselines struggle to detect them, showing over a 19% absolute gap with the humans. We hope this initial study could help readers to gain an unbiased grasp of contentious issues through machine-aided comparison.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown tremendous success in following user instructions and generating helpful responses. Nevertheless, their robustness is still far from optimal, as they may generate significantly inconsistent responses due to minor changes in the verbalized instructions. Recent literature has explored this inconsistency issue, highlighting the importance of continued improvement in the robustness of response generation. However, systematic analysis and solutions are still lacking. In this paper, we quantitatively define the inconsistency problem and propose a two-stage training framework consisting of instruction-augmented supervised fine-tuning and consistency alignment training. The first stage helps a model generalize on following instructions via similar instruction augmentations. In the second stage, we improve the diversity and help the model understand which responses are more aligned with human expectations by differentiating subtle differences in similar responses. The training process is accomplished by self-rewards inferred from the trained model at the first stage without referring to external human preference resources. We conduct extensive experiments on recent publicly available LLMs on instruction-following tasks and demonstrate the effectiveness of our training framework.

Knowing how to use words appropriately has been a key to improving language proficiency. Previous studies typically discuss how students learn receptively to select the correct candidate from a set of confusing words in the fill-in-the-blank task where specific context is given. In this paper, we go one step further, assisting students to learn to use confusing words appropriately in a productive task: sentence translation. We leverage the GiveMeExample system, which suggests example sentences for each confusing word, to achieve this goal. In this study, students learn to differentiate the confusing words by reading the example sentences, and then choose the appropriate word(s) to complete the sentence translation task. Results show students made substantial progress in terms of sentence structure. In addition, highly proficient students better managed to learn confusing words. In view of the influence of the first language on learners, we further propose an effective approach to improve the quality of the suggested sentences.

Real-world instructions with multiple constraints pose a significant challenge to existing large language models (LLMs). An observation is that the LLMs exhibit dramatic performance fluctuation when disturbing the order of the incorporated constraints. Yet, none of the existing works has systematically investigated this position bias problem in the field of multi-constraint instruction following. To bridge this gap, we design a probing task where we quantitatively measure the difficulty distribution of the constraints by a novel Difficulty Distribution Index (CDDI). Through the experimental results, we find that LLMs are more performant when presented with the constraints in a ``hard-to-easy'' order. This preference can be generalized to LLMs with different architecture or different sizes of parameters. Additionally, we conduct an explanation study, providing an intuitive insight into the correlation between the LLM's attention and constraint orders. Our code and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/meowpass/PBIF.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

Negation is poorly captured by current language models, although the extent of this problem is not widely understood. We introduce a natural language inference (NLI) test suite to enable probing the capabilities of NLP methods, with the aim of understanding sub-clausal negation. The test suite contains premise--hypothesis pairs where the premise contains sub-clausal negation and the hypothesis is constructed by making minimal modifications to the premise in order to reflect different possible interpretations. Aside from adopting standard NLI labels, our test suite is systematically constructed under a rigorous linguistic framework. It includes annotation of negation types and constructions grounded in linguistic theory, as well as the operations used to construct hypotheses. This facilitates fine-grained analysis of model performance. We conduct experiments using pre-trained language models to demonstrate that our test suite is more challenging than existing benchmarks focused on negation, and show how our annotation supports a deeper understanding of the current NLI capabilities in terms of negation and quantification.

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

Collaborative dialogue relies on participants incrementally establishing common ground, yet in asymmetric settings they may believe they agree while referring to different entities. We introduce a perspectivist annotation scheme for the HCRC MapTask corpus (Anderson et al., 1991) that separately captures speaker and addressee grounded interpretations for each reference expression, enabling us to trace how understanding emerges, diverges, and repairs over time. Using a scheme-constrained LLM annotation pipeline, we obtain 13k annotated reference expressions with reliability estimates and analyze the resulting understanding states. The results show that full misunderstandings are rare once lexical variants are unified, but multiplicity discrepancies systematically induce divergences, revealing how apparent grounding can mask referential misalignment. Our framework provides both a resource and an analytic lens for studying grounded misunderstanding and for evaluating (V)LLMs' capacity to model perspective-dependent grounding in collaborative dialogue.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are predominantly trained and tested on consistent visual-textual inputs, leaving open the question of whether they can handle inconsistencies in real-world, layout-rich content. To bridge this gap, we propose the Multimodal Inconsistency Reasoning (MMIR) benchmark to assess MLLMs' ability to detect and reason about semantic mismatches in artifacts such as webpages, presentation slides, and posters. MMIR comprises 534 challenging samples, each containing synthetically injected errors across five reasoning-heavy categories: Factual Contradiction, Identity Misattribution, Contextual Mismatch, Quantitative Discrepancy, and Temporal/Spatial Incoherence. We evaluate six state-of-the-art MLLMs, showing that models with dedicated multimodal reasoning capabilities, such as o1, substantially outperform their counterparts while open-source models remain particularly vulnerable to inconsistency errors. Detailed error analyses further show that models excel in detecting inconsistencies confined to a single modality, particularly in text, but struggle with cross-modal conflicts and complex layouts. Probing experiments reveal that single-modality prompting, including Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Set-of-Mark (SoM) methods, yields marginal gains, revealing a key bottleneck in cross-modal reasoning. Our findings highlight the need for advanced multimodal reasoning and point to future research on multimodal inconsistency.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at many natural language tasks, yet their reasoning reliability under structured perturbations of rule-based systems remains brittle. We present a controlled evaluation framework consisting of four stress tests: (1) rule deletion (redundant vs. essential), (2) contradictory evidence injection, (3) logic-preserving rewrites, and (4) multi-law equivalence stacking. While representative model families (BERT, Qwen2, and TinyLlama) achieve Acc = 1.0000 on base tasks, our framework reveals a critical failure mode termed Logic Inertia - a total breakdown with Acc = 0.0000 under contradictions, where deductive momentum overrides factual reality. To address this, we propose Conflict-Aware Fusion (Fusion-Conflict), a framework grounded in the Cognitive Structure Hypothesis, which posits that robust reasoning requires an explicit structural inductive bias. By imposing a dual-process architecture that separates premise verification from logical deduction, Conflict-Aware Fusion effectively mitigates logic inertia under the proposed evaluation framework, achieving 1.0000 accuracy on both base and contradictory stress tests. It also significantly enhances robustness to missing evidence. Our results demonstrate that, for reliable multi-step reasoning, structural verification discipline is as critical as training data scale, providing a potential blueprint for building robust, contradiction-aware AI systems this https://github.com/14H034160212/lemo . See the OpenAI/Evals pull request this https://github.com/openai/evals/pull/1622 .

ChatGPT brings revolutionary social value but also raises concerns about the misuse of AI-generated text. Consequently, an important question is how to detect whether texts are generated by ChatGPT or by human. Existing detectors are built upon the assumption that there are distributional gaps between human-generated and AI-generated text. These gaps are typically identified using statistical information or classifiers. Our research challenges the distributional gap assumption in detectors. We find that detectors do not effectively discriminate the semantic and stylistic gaps between human-generated and AI-generated text. Instead, the "subtle differences", such as an extra space, become crucial for detection. Based on this discovery, we propose the SpaceInfi strategy to evade detection. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of this strategy across multiple benchmarks and detectors. We also provide a theoretical explanation for why SpaceInfi is successful in evading perplexity-based detection. And we empirically show that a phenomenon called token mutation causes the evasion for language model-based detectors. Our findings offer new insights and challenges for understanding and constructing more applicable ChatGPT detectors.

The development of generative language models that can create long and coherent textual outputs via autoregression has lead to a proliferation of uses and a corresponding sweep of analyses as researches work to determine the limitations of this new paradigm. Unlike humans, these 'Large Language Models' (LLMs) are highly sensitive to small changes in their inputs, leading to unwanted inconsistency in their behavior. One problematic inconsistency when LLMs are used to answer multiple-choice questions or analyze multiple inputs is order dependency: the output of an LLM can (and often does) change significantly when sub-sequences are swapped, despite both orderings being semantically identical. In this paper we present , a technique that guarantees the output of an LLM will not have order dependence on a specified set of sub-sequences. We show that this method provably eliminates order dependency, and that it can be applied to any transformer-based LLM to enable text generation that is unaffected by re-orderings. Delving into the implications of our method, we show that, despite our inputs being out of distribution, the impact on expected accuracy is small, where the expectation is over the order of uniformly chosen shuffling of the candidate responses, and usually significantly less in practice. Thus, can be used as a 'dropped-in' method on fully trained models. Finally, we discuss how our method's success suggests that other strong guarantees can be obtained on LLM performance via modifying the input representations.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Ambiguity remains a fundamental challenge in Natural Language Processing (NLP) due to the inherent complexity and flexibility of human language. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), addressing ambiguity has become even more critical due to their expanded capabilities and applications. In the context of Conversational Question Answering (CQA), this paper explores the definition, forms, and implications of ambiguity for language driven systems, particularly in the context of LLMs. We define key terms and concepts, categorize various disambiguation approaches enabled by LLMs, and provide a comparative analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. We also explore publicly available datasets for benchmarking ambiguity detection and resolution techniques and highlight their relevance for ongoing research. Finally, we identify open problems and future research directions, proposing areas for further investigation. By offering a comprehensive review of current research on ambiguities and disambiguation with LLMs, we aim to contribute to the development of more robust and reliable language systems.

Advances in unsupervised probes such as Contrast-Consistent Search (CCS), which reveal latent beliefs without relying on token outputs, raise the question of whether these methods can reliably assess model alignment. We investigate this by examining the sensitivity of CCS to harmful vs. safe statements and by introducing Polarity-Aware CCS (PA-CCS), a method for evaluating whether a model's internal representations remain consistent under polarity inversion. We propose two alignment-oriented metrics, Polar-Consistency and the Contradiction Index, to quantify the semantic robustness of a model's latent knowledge. To validate PA-CCS, we curate two main datasets and one control dataset containing matched harmful-safe sentence pairs constructed using different methodologies (concurrent and antagonistic statements). We apply PA-CCS to 16 language models. Our results show that PA-CCS identifies both architectural and layer-specific differences in the encoding of latent harmful knowledge. Notably, replacing the negation token with a meaningless marker degrades PA-CCS scores for models with well-aligned internal representations, while models lacking robust internal calibration do not exhibit this degradation. Our findings highlight the potential of unsupervised probing for alignment evaluation and emphasize the need to incorporate structural robustness checks into interpretability benchmarks. Code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/SadSabrina/polarity-probing. WARNING: This paper contains potentially sensitive, harmful, and offensive content.

Instruction following (IF) is a critical capability for large language models (LLMs). However, handling complex instructions with multiple constraints remains challenging. Previous methods typically select preference pairs based on the number of constraints they satisfy, introducing noise where chosen examples may fail to follow some constraints and rejected examples may excel in certain respects over the chosen ones. To address the challenge of aligning with multiple preferences, we propose a simple yet effective method called Reverse Preference Optimization (RPO). It mitigates noise in preference pairs by dynamically reversing the constraints within the instruction to ensure the chosen response is perfect, alleviating the burden of extensive sampling and filtering to collect perfect responses. Besides, reversal also enlarges the gap between chosen and rejected responses, thereby clarifying the optimization direction and making it more robust to noise. We evaluate RPO on two multi-turn IF benchmarks, Sysbench and Multi-IF, demonstrating average improvements over the DPO baseline of 4.6 and 2.5 points (on Llama-3.1 8B), respectively. Moreover, RPO scales effectively across model sizes (8B to 70B parameters), with the 70B RPO model surpassing GPT-4o.

Task-oriented dialogues must maintain consistency both within the dialogue itself, ensuring logical coherence across turns, and with the conversational domain, accurately reflecting external knowledge. We propose to conceptualize dialogue consistency as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP), wherein variables represent segments of the dialogue referencing the conversational domain, and constraints among variables reflect dialogue properties, including linguistic, conversational, and domain-based aspects. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, we utilize a CSP solver to detect inconsistencies in dialogues re-lexicalized by an LLM. Our findings indicate that: (i) CSP is effective to detect dialogue inconsistencies; and (ii) consistent dialogue re-lexicalization is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving only a 0.15 accuracy rate when compared to a CSP solver. Furthermore, through an ablation study, we reveal that constraints derived from domain knowledge pose the greatest difficulty in being respected. We argue that CSP captures core properties of dialogue consistency that have been poorly considered by approaches based on component pipelines.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

We resolve a $1000 Erdős prize problem, complete with formal verification generated by a large language model. In over a dozen papers, beginning in 1976 and spanning two decades, Paul Erdős repeatedly posed one of his "favourite" conjectures: every finite Sidon set can be extended to a finite perfect difference set. We establish that {1, 2, 4, 8, 13} is a counterexample to this conjecture. During the preparation of this paper, we discovered that although this problem was presumed to be open for half a century, Marshall Hall, Jr. published a different counterexample three decades before Erdős first posed the problem. With a healthy skepticism of this apparent oversight, and out of an abundance of caution, we used ChatGPT to vibe code a Lean proof of both Hall's and our counterexamples.

Many text generation applications require the generated text to be factually consistent with input information. Automatic evaluation of factual consistency is challenging. Previous work has developed various metrics that often depend on specific functions, such as natural language inference (NLI) or question answering (QA), trained on limited data. Those metrics thus can hardly assess diverse factual inconsistencies (e.g., contradictions, hallucinations) that occur in varying inputs/outputs (e.g., sentences, documents) from different tasks. In this paper, we propose AlignScore, a new holistic metric that applies to a variety of factual inconsistency scenarios as above. AlignScore is based on a general function of information alignment between two arbitrary text pieces. Crucially, we develop a unified training framework of the alignment function by integrating a large diversity of data sources, resulting in 4.7M training examples from 7 well-established tasks (NLI, QA, paraphrasing, fact verification, information retrieval, semantic similarity, and summarization). We conduct extensive experiments on large-scale benchmarks including 22 evaluation datasets, where 19 of the datasets were never seen in the alignment training. AlignScore achieves substantial improvement over a wide range of previous metrics. Moreover, AlignScore (355M parameters) matches or even outperforms metrics based on ChatGPT and GPT-4 that are orders of magnitude larger.

A machine learning system can score well on a given test set by relying on heuristics that are effective for frequent example types but break down in more challenging cases. We study this issue within natural language inference (NLI), the task of determining whether one sentence entails another. We hypothesize that statistical NLI models may adopt three fallible syntactic heuristics: the lexical overlap heuristic, the subsequence heuristic, and the constituent heuristic. To determine whether models have adopted these heuristics, we introduce a controlled evaluation set called HANS (Heuristic Analysis for NLI Systems), which contains many examples where the heuristics fail. We find that models trained on MNLI, including BERT, a state-of-the-art model, perform very poorly on HANS, suggesting that they have indeed adopted these heuristics. We conclude that there is substantial room for improvement in NLI systems, and that the HANS dataset can motivate and measure progress in this area

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Wikipedia is the largest open knowledge corpus, widely used worldwide and serving as a key resource for training large language models (LLMs) and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems. Ensuring its accuracy is therefore critical. But how accurate is Wikipedia, and how can we improve it? We focus on inconsistencies, a specific type of factual inaccuracy, and introduce the task of corpus-level inconsistency detection. We present CLAIRE, an agentic system that combines LLM reasoning with retrieval to surface potentially inconsistent claims along with contextual evidence for human review. In a user study with experienced Wikipedia editors, 87.5% reported higher confidence when using CLAIRE, and participants identified 64.7% more inconsistencies in the same amount of time. Combining CLAIRE with human annotation, we contribute WIKICOLLIDE, the first benchmark of real Wikipedia inconsistencies. Using random sampling with CLAIRE-assisted analysis, we find that at least 3.3% of English Wikipedia facts contradict another fact, with inconsistencies propagating into 7.3% of FEVEROUS and 4.0% of AmbigQA examples. Benchmarking strong baselines on this dataset reveals substantial headroom: the best fully automated system achieves an AUROC of only 75.1%. Our results show that contradictions are a measurable component of Wikipedia and that LLM-based systems like CLAIRE can provide a practical tool to help editors improve knowledge consistency at scale.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

A number of recent benchmarks seek to assess how well models handle natural language negation. However, these benchmarks lack the controlled example paradigms that would allow us to infer whether a model had learned how negation morphemes semantically scope. To fill these analytical gaps, we present the Scoped Negation NLI (ScoNe-NLI) benchmark, which contains contrast sets of six examples with up to two negations where either zero, one, or both negative morphemes affect the NLI label. We use ScoNe-NLI to assess fine-tuning and in-context learning strategies. We find that RoBERTa and DeBERTa models solve ScoNe-NLI after many shot fine-tuning. For in-context learning, we test InstructGPT models and find that most prompt strategies are not successful, including those using step-by-step reasoning. To better understand this result, we extend ScoNe with ScoNe-NLG, a sentence completion test set that embeds negation reasoning in short narratives. Here, InstructGPT is successful, which reveals the model can correctly reason about negation, but struggles to do so on prompt-adapted NLI examples outside of its core pretraining regime.

Despite the frequent challenges posed by ambiguity when representing meaning via natural language, it is often ignored or deliberately removed in tasks mapping language to formally-designed representations, which generally assume a one-to-one mapping between linguistic and formal representations. We attempt to address this shortcoming by introducing AmP, a framework, dataset, and challenge for translating ambiguous natural language to formal representations like logic and code. We define templates and generate data for five well-documented linguistic ambiguities. Using AmP, we investigate how several few-shot text-to-code systems handle ambiguity, introducing three new metrics. We find that large pre-trained models perform poorly at capturing the distribution of possible meanings without deliberate instruction. However, models are able to capture the distribution well when ambiguity is attested in their inputs. These results motivate a call for including ambiguity explicitly in datasets and promote considering the distribution of possible outputs when evaluating systems. Data and code: https://github.com/esteng/ambiguous_parsing

Ensuring that Large Language Models (LLMs) generate summaries faithful to a given source document is essential for real-world applications. While prior research has explored LLM faithfulness, existing benchmarks suffer from annotation ambiguity, primarily due to the ill-defined boundary of permissible external knowledge in generated outputs. For instance, common sense is often incorporated into responses and labeled as "faithful", yet the acceptable extent of such knowledge remains unspecified, leading to inconsistent annotations. To address this issue, we propose a novel faithfulness annotation framework, which introduces an intermediate category, Out-Dependent, to classify cases where external knowledge is required for verification. Using this framework, we construct VeriGray (Verification with the Gray Zone) -- a new unfaithfulness detection benchmark in summarization. Statistics reveal that even SOTA LLMs, such as GPT-5, exhibit hallucinations (sim 6% of sentences) in summarization tasks. Moreover, a substantial proportion (sim 8% on average of models) of generated sentences fall into the Out-Dependent category, underscoring the importance of resolving annotation ambiguity in unfaithfulness detection benchmarks. Experiments demonstrate that our benchmark poses significant challenges to multiple baseline methods, indicating considerable room for future improvement.

The transition from the superconducting to the normal state in a magnetic field was considered as a irreversible thermodynamic process before 1933 because of Joule heating. But all physicists became to consider this transition as reversible after 1933 because of the obvious contradiction of the Meissner effect with the second law of thermodynamics if this transition is considered as a irreversible process. This radical change of the opinion contradicted logic since the dissipation of the kinetic energy of the surface screening current into Joule heat in the normal state cannot depend on how this current appeared in the superconducting state. The inconsistency of the conventional theory of superconductivity, created in the framework of the equilibrium thermodynamics, with Joule heating, on which Jorge Hirsch draws reader's attention, is a consequence of this history. In order to avoid contradiction with the second law of thermodynamics, physicists postulated in the thirties of the last century that the surface screening current is damped without the generation of Joule heat. This postulate contradicts not only logic and the conventional theory of superconductivity but also experimental results.

A primary concern regarding training large language models (LLMs) is whether they abuse copyrighted online text. With the increasing training data scale and the prevalence of LLMs in daily lives, two problems arise: 1) false positive membership inference results misled by similar examples; 2) membership inference methods are usually too complex for end users to understand and use. To address these issues, we propose an alternative insert-and-detect methodology, advocating that web users and content platforms employ \textit{unique identifiers} for reliable and independent membership inference. Users and platforms can create their identifiers, embed them in copyrighted text, and independently detect them in future LLMs. As an initial demonstration, we introduce \textbf{ghost sentences} and a user-friendly last-k words test, allowing end users to chat with LLMs for membership inference. Ghost sentences consist primarily of unique passphrases of random natural words, which can come with customized elements to bypass possible filter rules. The last-k words test requires a significant repetition time of ghost sentences~(ge10). For cases with fewer repetitions, we designed an extra perplexity test, as LLMs exhibit high perplexity when encountering unnatural passphrases. We also conduct a comprehensive study on the memorization and membership inference of ghost sentences, examining factors such as training data scales, model sizes, repetition times, insertion positions, wordlist of passphrases, alignment, etc. Our study shows the possibility of applying ghost sentences in real scenarios and provides instructions for the potential application.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

This document presents a detailed description of the challenge on clarifying questions for dialogue systems (ClariQ). The challenge is organized as part of the Conversational AI challenge series (ConvAI3) at Search Oriented Conversational AI (SCAI) EMNLP workshop in 2020. The main aim of the conversational systems is to return an appropriate answer in response to the user requests. However, some user requests might be ambiguous. In IR settings such a situation is handled mainly thought the diversification of the search result page. It is however much more challenging in dialogue settings with limited bandwidth. Therefore, in this challenge, we provide a common evaluation framework to evaluate mixed-initiative conversations. Participants are asked to rank clarifying questions in an information-seeking conversations. The challenge is organized in two stages where in Stage 1 we evaluate the submissions in an offline setting and single-turn conversations. Top participants of Stage 1 get the chance to have their model tested by human annotators.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

Contrast consistency, the ability of a model to make consistently correct predictions in the presence of perturbations, is an essential aspect in NLP. While studied in tasks such as sentiment analysis and reading comprehension, it remains unexplored in open-domain question answering (OpenQA) due to the difficulty of collecting perturbed questions that satisfy factuality requirements. In this work, we collect minimally edited questions as challenging contrast sets to evaluate OpenQA models. Our collection approach combines both human annotation and large language model generation. We find that the widely used dense passage retriever (DPR) performs poorly on our contrast sets, despite fitting the training set well and performing competitively on standard test sets. To address this issue, we introduce a simple and effective query-side contrastive loss with the aid of data augmentation to improve DPR training. Our experiments on the contrast sets demonstrate that DPR's contrast consistency is improved without sacrificing its accuracy on the standard test sets.

Throughout the course of my Ph.D., I have been designing the user experience (UX) of various machine learning (ML) systems. In this workshop, I share two projects as case studies in which people engage with ML in much more complicated and nuanced ways than the technical HCML work might assume. The first case study describes how cardiology teams in three hospitals used a clinical decision-support system that helps them decide whether and when to implant an artificial heart to a heart failure patient. I demonstrate that physicians cannot draw on their decision-making experience by seeing only patient data on paper. They are also confused by some fundamental premises upon which ML operates. For example, physicians asked: Are ML predictions made based on clinicians' best efforts? Is it ethical to make decisions based on previous patients' collective outcomes? In the second case study, my collaborators and I designed an intelligent text editor, with the goal of improving authors' writing experience with NLP (Natural Language Processing) technologies. We prototyped a number of generative functionalities where the system provides phrase-or-sentence-level writing suggestions upon user request. When writing with the prototype, however, authors shared that they need to "see where the sentence is going two paragraphs later" in order to decide whether the suggestion aligns with their writing; Some even considered adopting machine suggestions as plagiarism, therefore "is simply wrong". By sharing these unexpected and intriguing responses from these real-world ML users, I hope to start a discussion about such previously-unknown complexities and nuances of -- as the workshop proposal states -- "putting ML at the service of people in a way that is accessible, useful, and trustworthy to all".

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

In interactions between users and language model agents, user utterances frequently exhibit ellipsis (omission of words or phrases) or imprecision (lack of exactness) to prioritize efficiency. This can lead to varying interpretations of the same input based on different assumptions or background knowledge. It is thus crucial for agents to adeptly handle the inherent ambiguity in queries to ensure reliability. However, even state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) still face challenges in such scenarios, primarily due to the following hurdles: (1) LLMs are not explicitly trained to deal with ambiguous utterances; (2) the degree of ambiguity perceived by the LLMs may vary depending on the possessed knowledge. To address these issues, we propose Alignment with Perceived Ambiguity (APA), a novel pipeline that aligns LLMs to manage ambiguous queries by leveraging their own assessment of ambiguity (i.e., perceived ambiguity). Experimental results on question-answering datasets demonstrate that APA empowers LLMs to explicitly detect and manage ambiguous queries while retaining the ability to answer clear questions. Furthermore, our finding proves that APA excels beyond training with gold-standard labels, especially in out-of-distribution scenarios.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

There have been a couple of studies showing that attempting to erase multilingual knowledge using only English data is insufficient for multilingual LLMs. However, their analyses remain highly performance-oriented. In this paper, we switch the point of view to evaluation, and address an additional blind spot which reveals itself when the multilingual LLM is fully finetuned with parallel multilingual dataset before unlearning. Here, language confusion occurs whereby a model responds in language different from that of the input prompt. Language confusion is a problematic phenomenon in unlearning, causing the standard reference-based metrics to fail. We tackle this phenomenon in three steps: (1) introduce N-gram-based Language-Mix (N-Mix) score to quantitatively show the language confusion is pervasive and consistent in multilingual LLMs, (2) demonstrate that reference-based metrics result in false negatives when N-Mix score is high, and(3) suggest the need of new type of unlearning evaluation that can directly assess the content of the generated sentences. We call this type of metrics as semantic-based metric.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

As the probability (and thus perplexity) of a text is calculated based on the product of the probabilities of individual tokens, it may happen that one unlikely token significantly reduces the probability (i.e., increase the perplexity) of some otherwise highly probable input, while potentially representing a simple typographical error. Also, given that perplexity is a scalar value that refers to the entire input, information about the probability distribution within it is lost in the calculation (a relatively good text that has one unlikely token and another text in which each token is equally likely they can have the same perplexity value), especially for longer texts. As an alternative to scalar perplexity this research proposes a simple algorithm used to calculate vector values based on n-gram perplexities within the input. Such representations consider the previously mentioned aspects, and instead of a unique value, the relative perplexity of each text token is calculated, and these values are combined into a single vector representing the input.

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for open-domain question answering, yet their alignment with human perspectives on temporally recent information remains underexplored. We introduce RECOM (Reddit Evaluation for Correspondence of Models), a benchmark dataset of 15,000 recent Reddit questions from September 2025 paired with community-derived reference answers. We investigate how four open-source LLMs (Llama3.1-8B, Mistral-7B, Gemma-2-9B, and GPT-OSS-20B) respond to these questions, evaluating alignment using lexical metrics (BLEU, ROUGE), semantic similarity (BERTScore, MoverScore, cosine similarity), and logical inference (NLI). Our central finding is a striking semantic-lexical paradox: all models achieve over 99% cosine similarity with references despite less than 8% BLEU-1 overlap, a 90+ percentage point gap indicating that models preserve meaning through extensive paraphrasing rather than lexical reproduction. MoverScore (51-53%) confirms this pattern, occupying an intermediate position that reflects the optimal transport cost of semantic alignment. Furthermore, model scale does not predict performance: Mistral-7B (7B parameters) outperforms GPT-OSS-20B (20B parameters) across all metrics. NLI analysis reveals that contradiction rates remain below 7%, suggesting models rarely generate content that directly conflicts with human consensus. These findings challenge the reliability of lexical metrics for evaluating abstractive generation and argue for multi-dimensional evaluation frameworks that capture semantic fidelity beyond surface-level text matching. The RECOM dataset is publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/recom-D4B0

In the absence of abundant reliable annotations for challenging tasks and contexts, how can we expand the frontier of LLM capabilities with potentially wrong answers? We focus on two research questions: (1) Can LLMs generate reliable preferences among wrong options? And if so, (2) Would alignment with such wrong-over-wrong preferences be helpful? We employ methods based on self-consistency, token probabilities, and LLM-as-a-judge to elicit wrong-over-wrong preferences, and fine-tune language models with preference optimization approaches using these synthesized preferences. Extensive experiments with seven LLMs and eight datasets demonstrate that (1) LLMs do have preliminary capability in distinguishing various shades of wrong, achieving up to 20.9% higher performance than random guess; (2) Alignment with wrong-over-wrong preferences helps LLMs to produce less wrong and sometimes even outright correct answers, while overall improving model calibration.

We present the surprising finding that a language model's reasoning capabilities can be improved by training on synthetic datasets of chain-of-thought (CoT) traces from more capable models, even when all of those traces lead to an incorrect final answer. Our experiments show this approach can yield better performance on reasoning tasks than training on human-annotated datasets. We hypothesize that two key factors explain this phenomenon: first, the distribution of synthetic data is inherently closer to the language model's own distribution, making it more amenable to learning. Second, these `incorrect' traces are often only partially flawed and contain valid reasoning steps from which the model can learn. To further test the first hypothesis, we use a language model to paraphrase human-annotated traces -- shifting their distribution closer to the model's own distribution -- and show that this improves performance. For the second hypothesis, we introduce increasingly flawed CoT traces and study to what extent models are tolerant to these flaws. We demonstrate our findings across various reasoning domains like math, algorithmic reasoning and code generation using MATH, GSM8K, Countdown and MBPP datasets on various language models ranging from 1.5B to 9B across Qwen, Llama, and Gemma models. Our study shows that curating datasets that are closer to the model's distribution is a critical aspect to consider. We also show that a correct final answer is not always a reliable indicator of a faithful reasoning process.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Popular benchmarks (e.g., XNLI) used to evaluate cross-lingual language understanding consist of parallel versions of English evaluation sets in multiple target languages created with the help of professional translators. When creating such parallel data, it is critical to ensure high-quality translations for all target languages for an accurate characterization of cross-lingual transfer. In this work, we find that translation inconsistencies do exist and interestingly they disproportionally impact low-resource languages in XNLI. To identify such inconsistencies, we propose measuring the gap in performance between zero-shot evaluations on the human-translated and machine-translated target text across multiple target languages; relatively large gaps are indicative of translation errors. We also corroborate that translation errors exist for two target languages, namely Hindi and Urdu, by doing a manual reannotation of human-translated test instances in these two languages and finding poor agreement with the original English labels these instances were supposed to inherit.

Evaluating the performance of machine learning models under distribution shift is challenging, especially when we only have unlabeled data from the shifted (target) domain, along with labeled data from the original (source) domain. Recent work suggests that the notion of disagreement, the degree to which two models trained with different randomness differ on the same input, is a key to tackle this problem. Experimentally, disagreement and prediction error have been shown to be strongly connected, which has been used to estimate model performance. Experiments have led to the discovery of the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon, whereby the classification error under the target domain is often a linear function of the classification error under the source domain; and whenever this property holds, disagreement under the source and target domain follow the same linear relation. In this work, we develop a theoretical foundation for analyzing disagreement in high-dimensional random features regression; and study under what conditions the disagreement-on-the-line phenomenon occurs in our setting. Experiments on CIFAR-10-C, Tiny ImageNet-C, and Camelyon17 are consistent with our theory and support the universality of the theoretical findings.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Statements involving metalinguistic self-reference ("This paper has six sections.") are prevalent in many domains. Can large language models (LLMs) handle such language? In this paper, we present "I am a Strange Dataset", a new dataset for addressing this question. There are two subtasks: generation and verification. In generation, models continue statements like "The penultimate word in this sentence is" (where a correct continuation is "is"). In verification, models judge the truth of statements like "The penultimate word in this sentence is sentence." (false). We also provide minimally different metalinguistic non-self-reference examples to complement the main dataset by probing for whether models can handle metalinguistic language at all. The dataset is hand-crafted by experts and validated by non-expert annotators. We test a variety of open-source LLMs (7B to 70B parameters) as well as closed-source LLMs through APIs. All models perform close to chance across both subtasks and even on the non-self-referential metalinguistic control data, though we find some steady improvement with model scale. GPT 4 is the only model to consistently do significantly better than chance, and it is still only in the 60% range, while our untrained human annotators score well in the 89-93% range. The dataset and evaluation toolkit are available at https://github.com/TristanThrush/i-am-a-strange-dataset.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

By providing external information to large language models (LLMs), tool augmentation (including retrieval augmentation) has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs' static parametric memory. However, how receptive are LLMs to such external evidence, especially when the evidence conflicts with their parametric memory? We present the first comprehensive and controlled investigation into the behavior of LLMs when encountering knowledge conflicts. We propose a systematic framework to elicit high-quality parametric memory from LLMs and construct the corresponding counter-memory, which enables us to conduct a series of controlled experiments. Our investigation reveals seemingly contradicting behaviors of LLMs. On the one hand, different from prior wisdom, we find that LLMs can be highly receptive to external evidence even when that conflicts with their parametric memory, given that the external evidence is coherent and convincing. On the other hand, LLMs also demonstrate a strong confirmation bias when the external evidence contains some information that is consistent with their parametric memory, despite being presented with conflicting evidence at the same time. These results pose important implications that are worth careful consideration for the further development and deployment of tool- and retrieval-augmented LLMs.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

While large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance across diverse tasks, recent studies showcase that causal LLMs suffer from the "reversal curse". It is a typical example that the model knows "A's father is B", but is unable to reason "B's child is A". This limitation poses a challenge to the advancement of artificial general intelligence (AGI), as it suggests a gap in the models' ability to comprehend and apply bidirectional reasoning. In this paper, we first conduct substantial evaluation and identify that the root cause of the reversal curse lies in the different word order between the training and inference stage, namely, the poor ability of causal language models to predict antecedent words within the training data. Accordingly, permutation on the training data is considered as a potential solution, since this can make the model predict antecedent words or tokens. However, previous permutation methods may disrupt complete phrases or entities, thereby posing challenges for the model to comprehend and learn from training data. To address this issue, we propose Semantic-aware Permutation Training (SPT), which addresses this issue by segmenting the training sentences into semantic units (i.e., entities or phrases) with an assistant language model and permuting these units before feeding into the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPT effectively mitigates the reversal curse since the performance on reversed questions approximates that on the forward ones, and significantly advances the performance of existing works.

Understanding when two pieces of text convey the same information is a goal touching many subproblems in NLP, including textual entailment and fact-checking. This problem becomes more complex when those two pieces of text are in different languages. Here, we introduce X-PARADE (Cross-lingual Paragraph-level Analysis of Divergences and Entailments), the first cross-lingual dataset of paragraph-level information divergences. Annotators label a paragraph in a target language at the span level and evaluate it with respect to a corresponding paragraph in a source language, indicating whether a given piece of information is the same, new, or new but can be inferred. This last notion establishes a link with cross-language NLI. Aligned paragraphs are sourced from Wikipedia pages in different languages, reflecting real information divergences observed in the wild. Armed with our dataset, we investigate a diverse set of approaches for this problem, including token alignment from machine translation, textual entailment methods that localize their decisions, and prompting LLMs. Our results show that these methods vary in their capability to handle inferable information, but they all fall short of human performance.